MonographOpen Access

When Incentives Misfire: The Silent Cause Of Corporate Failures

Published 5 May 2026All rights reserved
Principal-Agent Theory

Abstract

A forthcoming monograph on principal-agent misalignment, governance failure, and institutional risk in development contexts.

Upcoming Monograph: When Incentives Misfire: The Silent Cause of Corporate Failures

Authored by our Principal Economist, Benard Kipyegon, When Incentives Misfire offers a compelling dive into the hidden vulnerabilities that threaten modern organizations. This forthcoming book explores the systemic risks that emerge when the goals of decision-makers (agents) drift away from the best interests of stakeholders (principals) — a misalignment that frequently leads to profound corporate instability and eventual collapse.

Drawing on advanced economic theory and practical examples from development contexts, the monograph unpacks the mechanics of the principal-agent problem. It reveals how poorly designed incentive structures silently erode corporate governance, making otherwise stable institutions vulnerable to preventable failures. By critically examining the dynamics of institutional risk, the book provides a clear framework for understanding why well-intentioned organizations often stumble from the inside out.

Ultimately, When Incentives Misfire serves as an essential resource for corporate leaders, policymakers, and development practitioners. It offers actionable insights on how to design more resilient institutions, properly align internal incentives with long-term goals, and safeguard organizations against the unseen forces of governance failure.

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